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Abstract 
In this conceptual paper, open innovation is considered from the point of view of 
collaboration between industry and academy. However, if considered under the 
framework of the Resource Based Theory, specifically regarding Transaction Cost, it 
can be shown that the two phenomena are in fact compatible. The discussion 
regarding Transaction Cost is focused mainly on the management resources available 
for the activity and the cost incurred as alternative cost compared to other activities 
the management could engage in, especially regarding the nexus of Industry-
Academy collaboration. SMEs faced with the ever increasing stress of intensive 
competition and limited by their resources in their abilities to deal with it effectively 
turn to collaboration as a solution. The discussion synthesizes two articles recently 
published as chapters in books (Porath, 2012a; Porath, 2012b) analyzing collaboration 
as an open innovation activity within the Resource Based Theory.  
 
Background 
 
In the two chapter recently published (Porath, 2012a; Porath, 2012b), a governmental 
instrument for encouraging Open Innovation via Collaboration between Industry and 
Academy was presented, as a case study and as a model. That instrument, the User's 
Association (UA) is an association supported financially by the government which 
surveys, selects and helps small and medium enterprises (SMEs) assimilate 
technologies or technological solutions to problems identified as interesting for 
specific sectors. The UA recruits an academy to do the screening identification, and 
selection of the solutions, and later to aid in the integration of the solutions by the 
SMEs, while managing the funds and the activity on behalf of the SMEs.  
 
The UA is an ad-hoc activity defined by quantified goals, term and funds. It has been 
shown to be very successful and helps SMEs in sectors from sectors with little or no 
R&D, and up to high-tech sectors.  
 
The theoretical background has been divided into the following subsections: 
1. Open Innovation – describing the development in research in that specific field, with 
recent developments oriented towards the SME relevance within open innovation. 
This section will also briefly discuss collaboration as a source of innovation, and 
2. Resource Based Theory – related to the issue of transaction cost, and to the limitation 
of resources and its impact on selection of activities. 
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Open Innovation and Collaboration 
 
The growing pressure on organizations to innovate and the limitation on that 
capabilities have pushed organizations towards seeking innovation out-side the 
boarders of the organizations (Smith et al., 1991; Dodgson, et al., 2006; Rahman and 
Ramos, 2010; Lee, et al., 2012). Organizations are increasingly relying on external 
sources of innovation via inter-organizational network relationships (Perkmann, 
2007). Thus SMEs are viewing external innovation as a viable alternative to that of 
internal innovation (Rahman and Ramos, 2012). External innovation for SMEs in that 
case is one that is found outside the boarders of the firm (Penrose, 1968). Redefining 
the boarders of the firms due to the changes in the environment of the firms has been 
going since Penrose (1968) defined them. The advent regarding collaboration in R&D 
and innovation activities have been opening the definitions to re-examination (Kirk, 
1995; Spender, 1996, Laursen and Salter, 2004). Additional developments such as the 
change in the perception of cooperation and competition - Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1998) reference to Co-opetittors, as a mix between competitors and cooperators have 
contributed to the complexity. 
 
Open innovation is a phenomenon that has become increasingly imperative to both 
practice and theory over the last few years (Gassmann and Enkel, 2004).The open 
innovation paradigm introduced the concept that firms can benefit from research and 
innovation coming from external sources as well as internal (Chesbrough, 2003). That 
need is becoming important not only to SMEs but also to larger organizations 
(Chesbrough, 2003). The capability to manage that knowledge and innovation on the 
outside as well as on the inside is an important element of the firm (Naqshbandi and 
Kaur, 2010). In our example mentioned above we deal with a veteran operation that 
has been practiced since 1994 continuously. 
 
Recent work has shown (Rahman and Ramos, 2012) that open innovation is a critical 
source of Innovation for SMEs. There are claims that it is not only a growth 
mechanism related to the entrepreneurial phase of the firm, but it is also an important 
source of innovation for mature SMEs (Porath, 2012a; Porath, 2012b). Furthermore, 
external innovation management capability is important in order to maintain 
competitiveness even in sectors that are not R&D intensive (Porath, 2012a).  
 
Economic Theory 
 
Economic theory at first glance would seem to be relevant when discussing the 
collaboration towards innovation. Since the work of Katz (1986) many economic 
models have been defined to describe the collaboration in an ever more increasing 
detail and resemblance to real world cooperation. Such models provided benefit to the 
participants and to society (defined as the social benefit) trying to establish the 
economic rationale for the collaboration. The early models (Katz, 1986; 
D’Aspremont, and Jacquemin, 1988) dealt with simple symmetrical two sided 
cooperation, in pre-competitive R&D, and tried to establish its benefit,  while assuring 
that the competition in the market place was not reduced, or damaged in any way – no 
breach of anti-trust. 
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However, models developed at later stage added asymmetry in the contribution and 
ability to enjoy the proceeds, and additional more lifelike parameters (Kamien, Muller 
and Zang, 1992; Yun, Park and Ahn, 2000; Pastor and Sandons, 2002; Miyagiwa, and 
Ohno, 2002; Fontana Geuna and Matt, 2006; EU, 2006).   The economic models 
mentioned above, also presented the benefits of performing R&D for the firm and the 
value of different modes of that R&D, alone or in collaboration, and different modes 
of collaboration (Rosenberg, 1990; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Katsoulacos and 
Ulph, 1998; Cabral, 2000).  It has been demonstrated that the firms benefit from R&D 
(Rosenberg, 1990) and that they benefit mostly from doing it in collaboration 
(Kamien and Zang, 2000)  in the mode best described as Collaborative Research (Olk, 
1991; Doz, Olk and Ring, 2000; Porath, 2008; Porath, 2010).  The specific economic 
analysis started with collaboration stemming from free will (Olk, 1991; Doz, Olk and 
Ring, 2000), and progressed towards government supported collaboration (Porath, 
2008).     At this point the authors like to  mention shortly that the role of the 
government (local, national or super-national) also evolved from a general discussion 
regarding the role of the government as analyzed by Luukkonen (1998, 2000) and in a 
more general way involving the Industry-Academy-Government Triple Helix by  
Etzkowitz and Leydersdorrf (1997).   
 
Resource Based Theory 
 
Another specific economic aspect is the scarcity of resources, especially management 
resources in SMEs that makes for reduced relative capacity (Naqshbandi and Kaur, 
2010) expressed as a reduced capacity to manage external resources. For open 
innovation the Transaction Cost includes the search for and identification of the 
Innovation options, selection of the most promising option and adopting it. That 
activity would strain the management resources in a small organization dealing in a 
small management team with various needs of the firm.     
 
The Resource Based theory and the Transaction Cost point of view would recommend 
that firms prefer paths of actions that would present the smallest transaction cost, and 
that they prefer actions with immediate and evident benefit (preferably in the near and 
foreseen future or present) to other more benefit obscure actions in the distant future 
(Parkhe, 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Kline, 2000). Furthermore, Resource-
based theory implies that firm resources and capabilities influence the growth and 
performance of the firm (Park and Lee, 2011) 
 
Open innovation archetype focuses on “technology uncertainty”, while transaction 
theory focuses on “behavior uncertainty” and resource-based theory focuses on 
“demand uncertainty”. Hence, synthesizing the transaction theory, open innovation 
theory and resourced-based theory, we can get an integrated analytical structure. 
However, these different theoretical perspectives do not conflict; they can be 
complementary to each other (Chen, 2010). 
 
 
Therefore, while the limitation of resources would drive SMEs to search for 
innovation external to them rather than utilize their limited resources to develop that 
innovation, the same reason would drive them to seek paths of actions with the 
smallest possible transaction cost to manage that external innovation  
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SMEs Limited resources and their impact analysis 
 
The CR, as a partnership between technological partners each performing their 
compatible research and gaining access to the results of each other (with limitations in 
disseminating to third parties), would seem to solve the Technology uncertainty 
problem dealt with by open innovation. It would also seem to solve the demand 
uncertainty as the CR, in its government supported form (Porath, 2010) would rule 
that out, as well as the behavioral uncertainty. The CR would seem like the perfect 
solution, but there is one important point to bear in mind – it is very resource draining, 
financially, HR wise and also management wise. The problem becomes clear when 
dealing with organization that has no R&D management capabilities. In such a case 
the need to manage the firm’s own R&D and liaise with the partners creates enormous 
strain on the management resources. Therefore, for firms with no R&D management 
capabilities on open innovation, where the innovation management is done by 
partners or sub-contractors seem optimal. 
 
However, in spite of increasing interest in open innovation, discussion about the 
concept and its prospective application to the SME sector has been excluded from 
mainstream literature (Lee et al., 2010). The limitation on the resources compel firms 
to consider the benefits derived from innovation compared to the cost of transaction 
versus the benefits and costs of transaction of other more directly linked towards 
generation of income activities (production, marketing, purchase etc.).  
 
Another aspect is that the need for innovation while evident and persistent (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996), is rarely as urgently evident as 
other needs such as production marketing etc. The lack of evident urgency makes it 
easier to postpone acting towards innovation in favor of other activities, while in 
parallel the innovation is deemed more costly when compared to the benefit. 
 
The need for management resources expressed as the availability of managerial 
capabilities, as well as the allocation of these capabilities towards specific needs of 
the firm is an important constraint for SMEs. In sectors where R&D is a vital 
capability, the management of R&D projects and their results is a vital managerial 
capability without which firms in these sectors cannot survive (e.g. high-tech, bio-tech 
and nano-tech sectors), and in many cases the firms in these sectors start with that 
capability (start-ups) which stays with them for the life of the firm. However, it has 
been observed that the same managerial capability deemed of less importance in 
sectors with little or no R&D (e.g. Jewelry) and would, therefore, develop later in the 
firm life or not at all. Other managerial capability, such as purchase, finance or 
marketing would be deemed more important.  
 
In such sectors, where the innovation related managerial capabilities would develop 
later or not at all, even external innovation would be difficult to manage. In fact as can 
be seen from the articles recently published (Porath, 2012a; 2012b), without that 
capability such SMEs find it hard to assimilate innovation, even when most of the 
work is performed on their behalf, as there is no other choice than to be able to 
manage innovation once the SME has reached the absorption stage. A part of the 
needs of the firm in management resources is to have the ability to access 
management capacities, such as management capabilities and human resources 
(Harison and Koski, 2010). Accessing such capacities is harder for SMEs, especially 
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when competition and market stress are increasing. This difficulty raises the 
transaction cost of absorptive capacity and relative capacity and, therefore, the gap 
between transaction cost and the benefit derived from the activity. The increase in the 
gap would drive SMEs, in such times of increased stress, to concentrate their efforts 
on other tasks (for example in  marketing, purchase, or efficiency) and lower their 
innovation efforts. 
 
In such cases, if the firm lacks the managerial capacity to seek, identify and utilize 
financial aid tools for innovation (e.g. the FP, Eureka) their take-up of such tools will 
remain low.  It could be similar  to offering blind persons a colour TV, while they are 
unable to appreciate its advantage over a B&W set. 
 
Hence, in order to increase the attractiveness of innovation management capabilities 
one could increase the attractiveness of innovation (increase the benefit), which is 
difficult to do so when the market forces are already contributing to that effect in most 
sectors, but firms still find it easier to ignore than to contend with. The other option is 
to try and reduce the transaction cost.  
 
Discussion   
 
Firms are economic organizations, and therefore, they base their decisions regarding 
actions, development of capabilities and routines on economic basis (Rosenberg, 
1990). The economic basis of firms can be broader than pure financial, and can be 
sometimes described as alternative cost. The cost of the management share of mind 
for specific activity can be described based on the transaction or actions that the 
management cannot perform due to the lack of management share of mind.  
 
For a while it may have seemed as if the main transaction cost for innovation lay in 
the research infrastructure, and that it could be overcome by joint R&D, especially 
utilizing the academic infrastructure (such as, mechanical and human), it would now 
seem that at least for less intensive SMEs the problem and solution lay somewhere 
else. 
 
The cases presented by Porath (2012a, 2012b) regarding the open innovation scheme 
(User’s Association) present that specific problem and an answer. The transaction cost 
of managerial capacity required to allow SMEs to manage innovation and even to 
make use  of existing support tools created for it. Moreover, that increased transaction 
cost, especially in times on stress make the choice of allocating resources for 
innovation management more difficult for the SMEs. 
 
A potential answer by lowering of such transaction costs both by finding and 
allocating the tasks to external sources, but more importantly  in view of the relative 
capacity required the delegation of the management of the activity to external entities 
on behalf of the firms. This step is not without complications such as trust, avoiding 
opportunism and others, which are overcome by the long term activity and the 
existence of the “Guardian”, the governmental agency that acts as supreme judge and 
reduces the fear from the above mentioned dangers. 
 
In the sections above we have discussed an example of the use of the share of mind of 
management dedicated for a specific action thus removing a valuable resource from 
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the "available list" for other actions and limiting the number of actions the 
management can direct. However, if we want to discuss a situation more pertinent to 
our case we could deal with the following situation. The management of an SME can 
sustain at most four members. The entire firm is 30 workers. The four management 
members need to have at least one to manage the finance, one to manage the 
production and one to manage the sales, even if the CEO manages one of them in 
addition to the overall management that still leaves maintenance and purchasing, 
before legal matters (easily outsourced) or innovation. The last position can go to 
fulfill either of the functions or it can be used to take care  directly for innovation. In 
many cases of sectors those are low in innovation and research, the innovation is often 
left unattended, in favor of more direct income generating activities.  Thus the 
management groups lack the innovation capabilities, including the ability to search, 
identify and acquire innovation knowledge and ties, the ability to manage the process 
and to fund it, among others.  
 
In high-tech start-ups or other technology oriented start-ups, the entrepreneurial 
process demands that the management team becomes an expert in innovation 
management and acquire all the relevant skills. These management teams are also 
constructed to grow and change, and add members and capabilities. These SMEs are, 
therefore, different in their regard for innovation and in many cases for strategic 
reasons are content with closed innovation and not with open innovation (Porath, 
2010). However, they are not the topic of discussion here.  
 
In the cases where the management team lacks the ability to manage innovation, there 
are different levels of tasks regarding the cost of transaction of managing innovation 
and open innovation.  
 
For such firms the management of internal or closed innovation would require 
management capabilities and the establishment of internal routines for the 
management and later absorbance of the innovation results.  That transaction incurs a 
cost, in the share of mind of the management, especially its resources, such as time 
and management skills.  However, in the case of open innovation, the task is  more 
difficult. For an SME to manage internal innovation would require the ability to 
manage (fund and direct) the innovation process, and to bring the results to fruition.  
 
However, to do so, on a remote scope would require remote management capabilities, 
the ability to negotiate with the external innovation partner and more. Therefore, the 
challenge would be greater. However, in the case of the UA there are some mitigating 
aspects. The UA due to its governmental authority umbrella (Porath, 2012a; 2012b) 
creates a framework that reduces the needs for remote management skills, that assists 
in the direction of the innovation process – how goals are set, designed and managed. 
. The UA also creates "insurance" like routines in the guise of the authority control 
and management that help establish relational assets by reducing the fear of 
opportunism and thus the requirements on the SME management to deal with them. 
The UA also supplies the funding for the process and removes another aspect of the 
process from the tasks allocated to the management – they still have to manage 
internally but not to remotely manage the partners, or create a liaison function 
internally. 
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The UA establishes the rules of participation, reporting, there is a central management 
facility that manages not only the input and output of each partner towards the others, 
but also controls the division of resources, makes sure the goals are adhered to, and 
that the partners overcome difficulties. There is also often managerial support, in 
many cases stronger on the financial side, but usually also extending to the technical 
management of the project.   
 
The UA, therefore, presents a solution to the increased transaction cost for SMEs and 
by removing most of the managerial capacity requirements allows the SME to 
participate in the innovation process.  That reduced transaction cost does not come 
free. However, the lack of demand for managerial capacity means that there is no 
incentive for the SME to develop that managerial capacity or acquire it in another 
way. Therefore, while the results of the UA are immediate mostly, they are also short 
term. In order to innovate again the SME will have to form another UA or find a 
different solution. 
 
Summary 
 
Transaction cost can influence the decision of SMEs in sectors with low R&D, to 
mange an innovation process. The transaction cost is heavy for open innovation as 
well as closed innovation. Therefore, especially in times of increased competitiveness 
and market stress, when the transaction cost of innovation also increases, and the 
immediate benefit is somewhat obscure, SMEs forego the need to innovation in favor 
of other activities. 
 
The lack in management resources can bring the SME to the point, where it cannot 
even make use of financial aid tools (lack of knowledge about their availability and 
relevance, or lack of the management ability to make use of them) for innovation. 
Effective tools like the UA, offer more than financial assistance, by removing most of 
the collaboration risks and apprehensions, but more important for our case, the 
managerial capacity demand. That assistance comes with a price, that it does not 
encourage the SME to develop the innovation related managerial capacities. It 
provides the fish but it does not teach the SME to fish. 
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